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Defense of the Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform
by Gillian Metzger
Along with the others, I want to thank David for organizing this panel.
The great advantage of going last is that the terms of the debate over
the Affordable Care Act's constitutionality have been established by the
other panelists. As a result, I am going to target my remarks on a few
key points, rather than walk through a full dress review of some of the
arguments. Like the others, my focus is on existing doctrine. I
completely agree with Dean Chemerinsky in thinking that the Supreme
Court is not going to change the key parameters of existing analysis, but
in any event, my point is that under existing doctrine the challenged
provisions are constitutional.
Let me begin with the arguments for the constitutionality of the
requirement that individuals purchase health insurance, and in
particular, the tax power argument which we have heard reference to,
but not too much discussion of, so far.12 9 That is an argument that
several courts have rejected in the litigation. My view, however, is that
the tax power offers a strong basis for the minimum coverage provision
and that emphasizing the tax power angle is important because it
clarifies how the provision operates. The provision really operates as a
tax. Failure to obtain health insurance is not made unlawful. The only
consequence is that anyone who fails to purchase health insurance-and
who is not exempt from the requirement or does not have insurance
through another route-becomes liable for an additional amount on his
or her annual tax return. There is no other enforcement. Further, this
additional amount is hardly punitive. It is capped in a variety of ways,
but the maximum it can ever be is basically the amount that it would
cost you to buy minimal insurance on a health exchange for yourself and
your family. So, at the most, it is equal to the cost individuals are
avoiding by not purchasing insurance.
It is well established that the tax power is quite broad and was made
intentionally so when the Constitution was drafted. The tax power
represents an independent basis of constitutional authority, and the
requirements the Court has imposed for what is a valid tax are quite

129. Greater elaboration of the tax power argument is provided in the briefs I have
filed along with two other constitutional law professors in support of the constitutionality
of the minimum coverage requirement. The latest version of the brief, filed in the Sixth
Circuit, is available on the ACA Litigation Blog run by Bradley Joondeeph, at: http://aca-liti
gation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Amicus+brief+on+constitutional+law+professors.pdf.
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minimal. To come under the tax power, a measure has to serve the
general welfare, have some relationship to a revenue-raising purpose, be
apportioned if a direct tax and uniform if an indirect tax, and not violate
any independent constitutional prohibition. I think the minimum
coverage provision meets these requirements.
The courts that have rejected the tax power argument have done so
pretty much entirely on the grounds that Congress did not intend the
provision to be a tax but instead intended it to be regulatory, a
mechanism for forcing individuals to purchase insurance, and therefore,
the tax power was not invoked. This conclusion is flawed in several
ways.
First, this conclusion is at odds with governing doctrine. The fact that
a measure has a primary regulatory purpose is simply not a sufficient
basis to pull something outside of the end of the tax power. Even if the
primary purpose of a measure is regulatory, it is still potentially a valid
tax. No one disputes that the primary purpose of the minimum coverage
provision is to encourage people to purchase insurance, but that alone
cannot preclude it from being a tax. In addition, to the extent there are
cases that have emphasized regulatory purposes to disqualify measures
as taxes, those decisions go back to the Lochner era and, moreover, were
instances in which a tax was being used to pull in a detailed scheme of
regulation that was otherwise wholly outside of Congress's power. That
is simply not the case here; instead, the detailed requirements imposed
by the Affordable Care Act, even those that are closely connected to the
minimum coverage provision, such as the prohibition on insurance
companies taking preexisting conditions into account in providing
coverage, are amply supported by Congress's commerce, spending, and
tax powers.
Second, the argument that Congress did not intend to invoke the tax
power represents a misreading of the record. There is actually a lot in
the record suggesting that Congress did want to invoke a tax power. It
is true that the amount due is called a penalty in the final version that
was enacted. It had at other times been called a tax in the legislation,
and other measures in the Act are called taxes. But the important point
is that there is very well-established case law holding that in the tax
area, labels are not determinative. Whether or not that should be the
rule, whether we should put more emphasis on whether or not Congress
calls a measure a tax, is a separate question. Given the case law,
however, it is very hard to conclude from the labels Congress used that
it did not intend to invoke the tax power because Congress had no basis
on which to know that its choice of nomenclature would be determinative.
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The bigger jurisprudential issue is that the courts are putting the
burden on Congress to identify the basis on which it is enacting a
provision. Although the district court in Florida expressly disavowed
that it was imposing a clear statement requirement on Congress, I think
that is the necessary lesson from rejecting the tax power argument on
the grounds that Congress did not intend the minimum coverage
provision to be a tax. Putting the burden on Congress is at odds with
the ordinary presumption of constitutionality that congressional statutes
enjoy and the assumption that Congress would intend to measure that
in an act to be sustained under any available constitutional basis. The
job of the courts is not to question Congress's motive in that regard, but
to simply determine whether such a basis exists.
For these reasons, I think the tax power argument is strong. Most of
the attention to date, however, has focused on Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clause arguments. Again, the terms of the debate have been
nicely focused by the other panelists and the ongoing litigation. No one
is denying that provision of health insurance generally, or health care
services, represents economic activity that Congress can regulate.
Instead, the claim is that Congress cannot regulate inactivity, and
failure to purchase health insurance represents inactivity. I think both
of those assertions are wrong. Although I agree with Dean Chemerinsky
on Congress's ability to regulate inactivity, I want to focus on the
assertion that the failure to purchase health insurance represents
inactivity. A basic mistake with this assertion is that it assumes that
the frame of analysis should center on the decision to purchase
insurance or not in a given year, rather than the wider context of
accessing health care services to which any decision to purchase
insurance or not is intrinsically linked.
No one buys health insurance as a goal in and of itself. We buy it to
access health care, and decisions to buy health insurance represent
decisions about how and when to access health care services. The key
point is that individuals who are foregoing health insurance are not
foregoing health care services; on the contrary, they "actively" obtain
health care services. Indeed, a big part of the problem is they are
obtaining services that they often cannot pay for, with the costs of this
uncompensated care then shifting costs onto the health insurance system
as a whole and the government. A brief filed by health economists in
the Florida case identifies 60% of individuals who do not have insurance
as having used health care services in a given year. Plus, there are
other economic activities connected to accessing health care that the
uninsured engage in, like buying medicines over the counter.
In short, as soon as you widen the frame and realize that this
provision is about accessing health care services, there is clearly activity
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going on. The idea that this is about inactivity is simply a mistaken
framing. More generally, realizing how easy it is to see activity at issue
here calls into question whether the asserted distinction between activity
and inactivity is a judicially-implementable or clear distinction. Instead,
the distinction is quite artificial and manipulatable. For example, if
Congress simply said, "Anyone in the past who has accessed health care
services or who will in the next five years must purchase insurance,"
there would be no doubt Congress was targeting activity. In substance,
I think that is not very different from what Congress did here, given the
fact that it is quite uncertain whether any particular individual is going
to need health care services in any given year.
Hence, the real question is not inactivity versus activity, it is who gets
to determine the scope of congressional regulation for the purpose of a
constitutional challenge. The plaintiffs are offering a very narrow
framing. Congress adopted a broader framing; it focused on access to
health insurance and health care services generally. That broader
congressional framing is clearly rational, and the Raich case makes clear
that courts should defer to Congress's rational determinations about the
scope of regulation, as opposed to accepting the framing offered by the
plaintiffs. I think that same principle applies. Once Congress's framing
is accepted, the provision represents a regulation of economic activity
that falls easily under the commerce power.
I have a couple of comments on the Necessary and Proper Clause.
One point is that frame of analysis matters here, too. If you emphasize
the Scalia concurrence in Raich, it makes clear that Congress can reach
activities in areas that might fall outside of the commerce power when
necessary to make effective a wider scheme of regulation. I do not think
there is much dispute about the close relationship between the
requirement that you purchase insurance and the problems of implementing the core access requirements of the Affordable Care Act, such
as the requirements that insurers have to issue insurance without
regard to pre-existing conditions and have to use community rating to
All those
set premiums rather than individuals' circumstances.
provisions are very integrally related to the minimum coverage
requirement, given the realities of adverse selection and what will
happen to insurance pools without this requirement. Again, all those
requirements fall under the commerce power, and the Necessary and
Proper Clause should sustain the minimum coverage provision as a
means of making those clear commerce regulations effective.
It is also important to note that there cannot be anything inherently
improper about the idea of Congress regulating inactivity, even
assuming that is what Congress is doing here. It is generally acknowledged that, in some other instances, Congress legitimately regulates
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inactivity. It requires you to file tax returns, for example, and you can
be required to register for the draft. Those are different enumerated
powers, and these measures do not represent Commerce Clause
legislation. The key point, however, is that in regulating inactivity in
these instances, Congress is also relying on the Necessary and Proper
Clause; requiring individuals to file tax returns is a mechanism for
enforcing Congress's tax power legislation. So, if there is anything
inherently improper about requiring activity when it did not exist before,
those measures should also fail.
I want to strongly echo a point that Dean Chemerinsky mentioned,
that animating these challenges is a particular vision of individual
liberty as freedom from regulation. The enumeration of powers in the
Constitution is also about protecting liberty. But the key question is
which visions of individual liberty we should see as protected by the
Constitution. As Dean Chemerinsky very well put it, we have long
rejected the idea that freedom from regulation is a strongly protected
liberty for purposes of the direct provisions of the Constitution. It makes
little sense that we would build that protection from regulation into the
scope of Congress's powers.
Let me say a couple of comments on the Spending Clause challenge to
the Medicaid expansion. I think the claims of coercion are a very hard
sell, in part because of atmospherics, such as the fact that the federal
government came through with substantial-nearly a hundred percent for
the first ten years-funding of the expansion of the Medicaid rolls, the
fact that in the Medicaid Act there is clear notice of Congress's ability
to change the terms, and the fact that Congress in the past has
dramatically expanded Medicaid. All of these make the claim of coercion
a hard one to win as a factual matter, but I also think it is hard as an
analytic matter.
The problem is that it is very difficult to come up with a judiciallymanageable standard for when changes to a spending program go too far
and become coercive. For example, why is this expansion in Medicaid
coercive, but not prior expansions, such as adding SSI or pregnant
women and children above the poverty line? Should we measure
coercion by the percentage of funding under a program that is put at
risk, or the absolute amount of federal funds at issue? Or should we
measure by the percentage of a state's budget that the funding
represents? These are all valid alternative metrics that lead to different
determinations about whether coercion exists. Of course, for some states
that have already expanded their Medicaid programs to 130% of the
poverty line, this expansion with the funding that came along with it
was hardly coercive at all. It was actually quite supportive of their
choices. And then there is the question of how to factor in the fact that
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different states have different political choices when it comes to their
budget. It is interesting that Florida and a number of states in the
twenty-state challenge do not have a state income tax. That is a choice
about how they want to fund their budgets, but how do we factor in
those choices in terms of deciding whether or not it is the change in
federal funds that is coercing them or their own political choices?
These problems are why the appellate courts and the Supreme Court
have rejected coercion claims of this kind. I read the courts as sticking
to a formalistic insistence on acceptance of conditional spending as
voluntary no matter what the felt reality of the states is precisely
because they do not see how they could implement a distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate spending conditions. Instead, the courts have
left that to political constraints, and I think they will do the same here.
The last thing I want to say goes to this question of political constraints. I think we have ignored the role that they played in the
Affordable Care Act, particularly in terms of, among other things,
ensuring that there would be adequate funding of the expansion of
Medicaid, also in terms of how the health exchanges were structured.
I disagree with the suggestion that the states were shut out of the
legislative process. The states actually had their interests acceded to in
a variety of ways. In fact, if you look at the Act beyond the challenged
provisions, it actually contains some very interesting federalism
reinforcing aspects that unfortunately have not gotten .as much
federalism attention, given the focus on the litigation. Thanks very
much.
(continued on next page)

